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The Proposed Rule to Govern Condemnation Cases in the United
States District Courts has now been under consideration for a
dozen years. The first draft of the Advisory Committee on Rules
of Civil Procedure appeared with other civil rules in the Report of
April, 1937, though it was withdrawn in the Final Report of No-
vember, 1937.' Later drafts appeared in May, 1944, and in June,
1947, while in May, 1948, the Committee made a final report and
recommendation to the Supreme Court. - The Court has, however,
returned the draft for further consideration by the Committee, par-
ticularly with respect to the vexing problem of the form of trial
of the issue of just compensation. Thus it has taken longer to draft
this rule than any other of the uniform rules adopted by the Court,
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals, 2d Circuit. Dean, Yale Law
School 1929-1939. Member of and reporter to Advisory Committee on Civil
Procedure of Supreme Court of the United States, since 1935.
' R. 74, Report of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure 184-
192 (April 1937), reprinted in 3 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE 3719-3721 (1938),
eliminated in the Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil
Procedure 46, 47 (November 1937), the Advisory Committee stating that the
original rule had been prepared at the urgent request of the Department of
Justice, and now was being withdrawn because of objections by various govern-
mental agencies and the request of the Department of Justice for its elimination.
'R. 71A, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure for the District Courts of the United States 79-93 (May 1944), omitted
from later drafts of proposed amendments for separate consideration, as
pointed out in Second Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments 80 (May
1945), and Report of Proposed Amendments iv (June 1946) ; Preliminary Draft
of Proposed Rule to Govern Condemnation Cases in the District Courts of the
United States (June 1947), reprinted in 7 F.R.D. 503-522 (1948); Report of
Proposed Rule to Govern Condemnation Cases in the District Courts of the
United States (May 1948). An intermediate draft prepared by a subcommittee
of the Advisory Committee appears in 32 A.B.A.J. 625-629 (1946).
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though the number of practitioners interested in the subject at any
one time has not been large. It may be said, however, that they
make up in emotion whatever they may lack in numbers.
The desirability of a uniform procedural rule to govern federal
condemnation appears well-nigh self-evident. Unfortunately this
fact does not force itself upon the attention of the profession except
occasionally, particularly in a time of national crisis, such as war,
when the Government is engaged in superhuman efforts to produce
munitions of war, to train large bodies of soldiers, and to erect a
vast war machine. On such occasions the necessity of securing
large tracts of land for governmental operations becomes obvious
to all. At other times-except for special projects, such as the
TVA, usually subject to their own special directions-the need is
less apparent and the dilatory proceedings under existing laws do
not provoke protest.
As a matter of fact, it seems not to be generally appreciated how
much these existing proceedings work to the disadvantage of all.
There has been considerable protest, unfortunately not too well
informed, that the Committee has yielded to the desires of the
Government bureaucrats to make condemnation easy for the sov-
ereign.3 This is not the case. It is the law under the important
Declaration of Taking Act of Feb. 26, 1931, that upon the filing in
the court of a "declaration of taking," either with the petition or at
any time before judgment, and the deposit of the sum of money
A not unrepresentative comment is that of the Committee on Administra-
tion of Justice of the State Bar of California, 23 Calif. S.B.J. 191, 192, 193
(1948): "It was the view of both Sections [of the Committee] that the main
idea of the rule as drafted was to make the condemnation of private property
easy for the particular governmental agency desiring to effect it .... We
cannot help but feel that this rule reflects a tendency which we believe to be
as unfortunate as it is manifest on the part of nearly all governmental agencies,
state as well as federal, viz.: a tendency to revert to the idea of the middle ages
that the state can do no wrong; that in any civil controversy between the state
and a private citizen, the rights of the latter are to be summarily disposed of
and all of the advantages given to the government." A main point of attack in
this report was the provision for objections to the complaint only through the
answer (and not additionally by motion)-a procedure which follows the
English general practice, has been urged for adoption here, Clark, Simplified
Pleading, A.B.A. Jud. Adm. Monographs, Ser. A, No. 18, 15-20, 24, 26, The
Judicial Administration Monographs, Ser. A (Collected), A.B.A. 100, 109-112,
115, 116 (1942), HANDBK. OF THE NAT. CONF. OF JUD. COUNCILS 136 (1942), 27
IOWA L. RaV. 272 (1942), 2 F.R.D. 456 (1943), 6 FED RULES SERV. 819 (1943);
CLARK, CODE PLEADING 535-545 (2d ed. 1947), and is particularly suited to the
.expeditious condemnation procedure, where formal objections to pleadings are
rare. Other rather severe criticisms are voiced in 32 A.B.A.J. 666 (1946) ; 34
id. 444, 528 (1948); and see also 32 id. 718 (1946); 33 id. 174, 1020, 1109
(1947); 71 A.B.A. REP. 80, 88 (1946). The criticisms of Mr. Walter P. Arm-
strong, directed to particular parts of the rule, are noted below. See notes 10,
26, 28 infra.
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estimated to be just compensation, the Government takes title to
the land and is in a position to apply for possession at once.4 Hence
it is thus literally true that the Government may proceed with its
project with no delay, while the parties wrangle for years over the
judicial remains and the deposit of just compensation lies unused
in the court. An especially unfortunate feature-which the pro-
prosed rule aims to correct-is that the disputes with some of the
property owners may serve to tie up disposition of the proceeds
as to others; such innocent bystanders may thus be deprived for
years of the money to which they are fairly entitled.5
Clearly there is nothing which a procedural rule can or should
do to interfere with this extreme, though necessary, sovereign
power. Doubtless the war could not have been so successfully waged
without it. It nevertheless is true that a landowner may be de-
prived of his realty, even of that "castle" where he lives, in prac-
tically the twinkling of an eye and literally before he knows what
has happened. And this-as sometimes seems forgotten-is the
law and practice under state condemnation also.,. It should be
obvious-as it apparently has not been-that the brunt and force
of the condemnation process comes from the law of the land and
'46 STAT. 1421 (1931), 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1946). So under the statute
authorizing condemnation for war purposes originally passed in 1917, 40 STAT.
241 (1917), 50 U.S.C. § 171 (1946), and re-enforced and expanded by the
Second War Powers Act 1942, 56 STAT. 177 (1942), 50 U.S.C. App. § 632 (1946)
-effective until Dec. 28, 1945, 59 STAT. 658 (1945), 5 U.S.C. APP. § 632a
(1946)-the Government might take immediate possession upon the filing
of the condemnation petition. This might well be long before the acquisition
of title through a declaration of taking. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229
(1945); Dade County, Fla. v. United States, 142 F. 2d 230 (C.C.A. 5th 1944) ;
United States v. 412.715 Acres of Land, 60 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Cal. 1945).
A 1918 act provides for the taking of immediate possession of property needed
for a work of river and harbor improvements authorized by Congress, 40 STAT.
911 (1918), 33 U.S.C. § 594 (1946) ; see 45 STAT. 536 (1928), 33 U.S.C. § 702d
(1946) for its application in the execution of the flood-control plan of the Mis-
sissippi River. A similar provision appears in the Atomic Energy Act, 60
STAT. 772, 42 U.S.C. § 1813b (1946).
'This was a point which particularly concerned and stimulated the vast
efforts for a uniform condemnation rule of the late Colonel Edgar B. Tolman.
Compare his statement in 32 A.B.A.J. 718 (1946).
"Consider such a provision as those in force in Connecticut since 1925,
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 1528-1531 (1930), §§ 198f, 199f (Supp. 1941), whereby the
highway commissioner has a power of condemnation for highway purposes for
the state, with a notice by mail thereafter to the property owner from the
clerk of the court, wherein the amount allowed by the commissioner as just
compensation has been deposited. See also the general statute authorizing the
taking of possession during the proceedings. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1310e (Supp.
1937). Such statutes show the error of the views of state law expressed in 32
A.B.A.J. (1946), criticized by Nichols, citing the law of Massachusetts and
other states, 33 id. 64 (1947), and explained by Colonel Tolman, 33 id. 379
(1947).
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that the procedural rule does not add at all to this force.
In view of this vast grant of unquestioned power already exist-
ing it would not seem surprising to find the representatives of the
Government less interested in a uniform rule than the property
owner for whom the new procedure would make the process less
confusing and the receipt of the compensation less delayed. And,
indeed, the Lands Division of the Department of Justice has
wavered from time to time, and as periods of crisis for condemna-
tion have come and gone, in its desire for such a rule.' Nevertheless
its need of the proposed procedure is also obvious. The multiple
diverse procedures now governing are such that the Division has
compiled and keeps up to date a bulky Manual setting forth the
various state and federal processes which must be known to the
Government attorneys. The very size of this departmental Manual
is a compelling argument for the rule. The diversity of procedure
comes from the fact that by various statutes Congress has pre-
scribed the practice in certain special condemnation proceedings
and, in the absence of such statutes, has directed general conformity
to local state practice." Since in the various states there are multi-
farious methods of procedure in existence-several in a single
state-the diversity of procedure thus resulting in federal con-
demnation is obvious. A learned study in 1931 reported that there
were 269 different methods of judicial condemnation in different
classes of cases, and 56 methods of nonjudicial or administrative
procedure., Certainly the number has not decreased since that time.
The choice of which of several state procedures is to be followed
is a problem for Government lawyers. The best they can do is to
choose the one which seems to apply to the most nearly analogous
state project or proceeding-a haphazard and question-raising
course at best. No wonder the Advisory Committee has been severe-
ly criticized for not producing a uniform rule despite the obstacles.10
Earlier changes of view are noted in note 1 supra; some repetitions have
appeared in correspondence and conference.
'The general conformity statute is 25 STAT. 375 (1888), as amended, 36
STAT. 1167 (1911), 40 U.S.C. § 258 (1946). Examples of particular procedure
as to the TVA and the District of Columbia are noted below.
'First Rep. Mich. Jud. Council § 46, pp. 55, 56 (1931), cited in Report of
Proposed Rule to Govern Condemnation Cases in the District Courts of the
United States 18 (May 1948).
"' Armstrong, Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 357 (1946); and see also
Armstrong, Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules for Civil Procedure, 4
F.R.D. 124, 134 (1945) ; Armstrong, Second Draft of Proposed Amendments to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 31 A.B.A.J. 497, 500, 533 (1945) ; Armstrong,
The Proposed Condemnation Rule, 7 F.R.D. 383 (1948); Armstrong, 71 A.B.A.
REP. 87, 88 (1946) ; Editorial, 32 A.B.A.J. 666 (1946).
The practical problems facing the Government attorneys are strikingly
stated in the following extract from the Report of United States Attorney
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In this brief essay I shall discuss particularly the major prob-
lems which have made the drafting of this rule so difficult. The
detailed questions as to the several subdivisions of the rule are
carefully set forth in the Notes to the Preliminary Draft of June,
1947, and the Final Report of May, 1948, which may be considered
incorporated by reference in this article. It should be said paren-
thetically that, although I have served as Reporter for this as well
as the other civil rules and am familiar with the background, the
opinions I shall express herein will be my own; the article has not
been submitted to the Committee as a whole. I shall devote major
attention to the two important problems as to the proper parties-
defendant and their notification, and the form of trial, whether by
jury, court, or commissioners. The first, although initially arousing
much heat, seems not overdifficult or insoluble; indeed, it is believed
to have been substantially solved. The second is still the real
stumbling block to a successful draft of a condemnation rule.
PARTIES-DEFENDANT AND THEIR NOTIFICATION
The problem as to parties-defendant in condemnation proceed-
ings involves both the question as to what persons shall be named
as defendants and the question as to how they shall be summoned
to answer. As to the first, both the 1937 and 1944 drafts provided
for the naming of all "known" owners and parties interested in the
property, with others to be designated generally as "unknown
owners."' 1 Upon the appearance of the 1944 draft vociferous ob-
jection, stemming particularly from abstracters and abstracting
Snyder-now Mr. Justice Snyder of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico-to
Attorney General Biddle, Jan. 15, 1942: "The impact of the defense emer-
gency has been felt most forcibly in our condemnation work. The United
States had never filed a condemnation case in Puerto Rico prior to 1939. Six
days after Germany invaded Poland in September, 1939, we filed our first
case against 1877 acres of land on our northwestern coast on which today
stands the famous Borinquen Air Base which has already earned the title of
watchdog of the Caribbean. Twenty-four hours after we received this first
request to condemn, we had obtained title to and put the Army in physical
possession of this land. But handling the resulting claims was a different mat-
ter. The local procedure is complicated, hunatreds of problems of law and fact
were involved, and the case has required months of work by several lawyers.
... There were 276 parcels in this tract, with 344 defendants named as having
an interest. Sugar cane, palm, coconut, fruit, and urban lands were involved.
Indeed, a supplementary case included an entire village. Schools, churches,
roads, agricultural experiments, irrigation ditches, and power lines were all
encompassed within this case," and similarly in the 49 additional cases, involv-
ing more than 15,000 acres of land in the island, filed by the time of the'report.
"See the 1937 draft, note 1 supra, R. 74 (b), stating, "In the body of the
complaint the names of all the owners of and persons interested in the prop-
erty sought to be taken shall be stated if known, and all others may be made
parties under the designation of 'unknown owners.'" And see also the 1944
draft, note 2 supra, R. 71A (b).
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companies, was raised on the basis that this did not even provide
for search of record owners and for their inclusion. Such an in-
terpretation was of course not intended; at most the objection
seems one of making a somewhat vague phrase more certain, hardly
justifying the many assertions that condemnation could be had
without notice to title owners of record.12 Obviously a procedural
rule could not cut off the claims of such owners. Further it was
clearly in the interest of the Department of Justice to include all
such owners, for otherwise the Government's title would be de-
fective because the interests of those not joined would not be at all
foreclosed by the proceeding. But this initial clamor of surprising
violence appears to have set many of the profession against the rule,
even though at the present time this objection has died away under
the rather clear showing that no such drastic deprival of property
rights was ever contemplated.
To clarify these provisions, the 1947 draft provided for notice,
before any hearing involving a particular property, to all persons
appearing of record and all persons known to the plaintiff to have
a claim and interest in the property. Persons unknown might still
be included under the designation of "unknown owners.' ' 13 To this
provision the Department representatives properly made objection,
pointing out that as a matter of practice wherever possible the
Department did make a complete record search, but that such a
search might prove not only unnecessary, but impossible, in certain
locales. Such a provision does appear to proceed on the erroneous
assumption that land record keeping is uniform throughout the
c6untry and uniformly sufficient to disclose by direct search all
persons who have ever had an interest in a particular piece of
property. In many parts of the country it is thus easy to go back
to an original grant from the sovereign, though this is impossible
in states along the Atlantic seaboard where there never was such
a patent. Moreover, the search involving property to be taken for
a short time, as a two- or three-year easement over vacant land for
the purpose of egress and ingress to other property, does not justify
the search which would be justified for the acquisition of fee simple
title in valuable property. Here again it is the condemnor who loses
by inadequate joinder; for owners not joined do not lose their
rights. There should be a common-sense business accommodation
in the light of what title searchers of the vicinity normally do.
This is believed to have been achieved in the provision contained
in the 1948 Report. There the plaintiff was required to name as
1 This has often been pointed out by Chairman Mitchell and others for the
Committee. For comparable state statutes see the Committee's Note in the 1948
Report, note 2 supra, at 25, 26.
11 See Preliminary Draft, June 1947, note'2 supra, R. 71A (c) (2).
[Vol. 10
PROPOSED CONDEMNATION RULE
defendants "all persons having or claiming an interest in that
property whose names can be ascertained by a search of the records
to the extent commonly made by competent searchers of title in
the vicinity in light of the type and value of the property involved
and also those whose names have otherwise been learned. All
others may be made defendants under the designation 'Unknown
Owners.' ","4 Judging by the general, comments this requirement
now seems to give rather general satisfaction. Some departmental
representatives have made some objection to details of the wording,
which can be easily revised if improvement is suggested. No good
ground for objecting to the principle of this generally flexible and
adaptable method has yet appeared.
The manner of notification has been based upon the settled idea
that those owners whose place of residence was known and who
lived within the boundaries of the United States, including its
territories and insular possessions, should be served with personal
notice by the appropriate United States marshal. Jurisdiction over
others, i.e., those whose residences are unknown or are outside the
United States, is acquired through service by publication. There
seems to be a general feeling that persons whose property is to be
taken are entitled to the extent of personal notice thus indicated,
and it is believed that the obligation on the plaintiff is not unduly
burdensome. A notice may be thus sent to any United States
marshal in any part of the country for service upon a person
resident within his district.17
Departmental representatives have, however, raised some ques-
tion as to the extent of personal service thus required in the 1948
Report. They object somewhat to such service upon parties resident
in United States territories and insular possessions. They object
more to what they suggest is a requirement of unreasonable search
as to a party's residence before service by publication can be had.
This is based upon the provision requiring as a prerequisite to the
latter service "the filing of a certificate of the plaintiff's attorney
stating that he believes a defendant cannot be personally served
because after diligent inquiry his place of residence cannot be
ascertained by the plaintiff or, if ascertained, that it is beyond the
territorial limits of personal service as provided in this rule." It is
urged that "diligent inquiry" must mean a search by F.B.I. or
other Government agents in all parts of the country to discover
that the place of residence cannot be ascertained.
It is believed, however, that this is a forced and unnatural appli-
"Report of Proposed Rule to Govern Condemnation Cases, May 1948, R.
71A (c) (2).
- Id. R. 71A (d) (3). The general interest in extensive personal service is
shown not only in the comments received by the Committee, but also in the criti-
cal comments cited notes 3, 10 svpra.
19491
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
cation of the rule, and that in view of the widespread and natural
demand for personal service the rule or its equivalent, if improve-
ments in wording can be suggested, is essential. There seems no
reason why personal service cannot be effected by a United States
marshal in Alaska or Hawaii equally with like service in a state.
As to the diligent inquiry, it is to be noted that the jurisdictional
requirement is the certificate, not the inquiry. It is difficult to
believe that a Government attorney would not feel justified-and
properly so-in making the certificate where a defendant, say, was
not found at his last known residence and had left no forward-
ing address, or on other like local inquiry as is customary in
ordinary cases.
Service is made of a notice-without copies of the complaint-
which is particularized as to a particular defendant to whom it is
directed, and as to his property, described sufficiently for its iden-
tification, but without inclusion of descriptions of other pieces of
property or the interests of others in the tract under condemna-
tion.1s This course of serving a notice thus brief and direct is
dictated by reasons both of convenience and of effective choice of
means to bring home to legally unsophisticated defendants the
action intended to be taken as it affects them. Government con-
demnation projects are now so vast that a complaint for a single
area may reach the dimensions of a book in its need of exact defi-
nition of all the parcels of land and their owners and claimants.
Throwing a book, in a quite literal sense, at an unsuspecting de-
fendant is no way of conveying actual information to him as to the
meaning of the proceeding. The simple direct way specified in the
rule seems therefore not merely adequate, but preferable. It ap-
pears, however, to have aroused an objection quite curious even
among the other peculiar objections stimulated by this rule, namely
that the defendants will be unfairly prejudiced unless the entire
complaint is served upon them and they may thus see who their
codefendants are and who may be possible allies in opposing the
"Id. R. 71A (d) (2); cf. also subds. (c) (3) and (d) (1). It will be no-
ticed that the rule provides for a wide joinder of separate pieces of property,
"whether in the saine or different ownership and whether or not sought for the
same use," R. 71A (b), a provision to which some objection has been raised,
but whose utility and convenience-subject to the general provisions giving the
court discretion to order severance or separate trials, FED. R. Civ. P. 21, 42 (b)
-are pointed out in the Committee's Note, 1948 Report, p. 24. The rule, in subd.
(e), still allows a defendant to contest the validity of the taking, provided he
has stated his defense in his answer, though experience shows such a defense
to have been almost uniformly unsuccessful in federal condemnation proceed-
ings. See United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 U.S.
546, 552, 557 (1946); United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 129 F. 2d 678, 683
(C.C.A. 2d 1942), cert. denied sub nom. Lambert, Ex'x, v. United States, 317
U.S. 698 (1943).
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governmental demands. This is notwithstanding the further pro-
vision of the rule that the complaint shall be filed with the court,
together with one copy for the defendants and "additional copies
at the request of the clerk or of a defendant." It appears to be
thought insufficient that a defendant may procure a copy of the
complaint; he must have it thrust upon him in order that a latent
litigious urge may be stimulated. One may perhaps wonder whether,
if that is the only way co-operative defense can be aroused, it can
deserve special attention or conservation. In any event, the sacrifice
of direct and convenient notice for such vague possibilities would
seem unjustified. It must be recalled, too, that in almost every case
the only possible issue is as to the amount of compensation of the
individual parcels; it is not possible to defeat the condemnation.
TRIAL OF THE ISSUE OF JUST COMPENSATION
The method of trial of the issue of just compensation has been
the great problem of the rule from its inception. That is, of course,
not unnatural, in view of the wide diversity of problems involved
in federal condemnations and the differing forms of trial of that
issue in use in this country. In state condemnation proceedings
about ten states require the use of a commission appointed by the
trial court, about eighteen provide for jury trial without a com-
mission, and some twenty provide for a commission to act in the
first instance, with the right of appeal and a trial de novo before
a jury. 7 A commission appears normally to be composed of three
persons, selected ad hoc for the particular condemnation, with their
fees paid by the condemnor and with their findings accorded a high
degree of finality on the issue of just compensation, except, of course,
where provision is made for later trial de novo.18 Under federal
law there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in a condemnation
proceeding." But under the general Condemnation Conformity Act
a jury trial in federal condemnation proceedings was had in states
which provided for a jury trial.20 In addition Congress has specially
'
1 This is a tabulation from the Lands Division Manual referred to above.
1
"See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 148 F. 2d 714 (C.C.A. 2d 1945) ; United
States v. Village of Highland Falls, 154 F. 2d 224 (C.C.A. 2d 1946); United
States v. Beard's Erie Basin, 157 F. 2d 956 (C.C.A. 2d 1946).
Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897) ; United States v. Hess, 70 F. 2d
142, 71 F. 2d 78 (C.C.A. 8th 1934) ; United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 129
F. 2d 678, 683 (C.C.A. 2d 1942), cert. denied sub nom. Lambert, Ex'x. v. United
States, 317 U.S. 698 (1943). See also Hines, Does the Seventh Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States Require Jury T ials in All Condemna-
tion Proceedings? 11 VA. L. Rgv. 505 (1925); Blair, Federal Condemnation
Proceedings and the Seventh Amendment, 41 HARv. L. REv. 29 (1927); 3
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 3007 (1938).
1' Under 25 STAT. 357 (1888), as amended, 36 STAT. 1167 (1911), 40 U.S.C.
§ 258 (1946). See, generally, 2 LEWIs, EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 509, 510 (3d ed.
19491
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
constituted a tribunal for the trial of the issue of just compensation
in two instances: condemnation under the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority Act and condemnation in the District of Columbia. Under
the TVA procedure the initial determination of value is by three
disinterested commissioners appointed by the court from a locality
other than the one in which the land lies. Either party may except
to the award of the commission. In that case the exceptions are
to be heard by three district judges, unless the parties stipulate
for a lesser number, who pass de novo upon the proceedings, may
take additional evidence, and fix their own value regardless of the
award made by the commissioners, but subject to review by the
court of appeals for the circuit.2 1 In the District of Columbia the
procedure is through a so-called jury of five freeholders appointed
by the court.2 2 After suggesting various alternatives in previous
drafts, the Committee came finally to conclude that these special
procedures provided by the Congress should be retained, while as
to all other cases any party should be entitled to claim a jury trial
on this issue, if claim therefor was filed within the time for answer
or such further time as the court might fix, with trial of all issues
otherwise to the court.22 The Committee was divided on the prop-
osition as to jury trial and the ensuing discussion and debate have
led the Court to call for further consideration of the matter by
the Committee.
As the debate developed, the chief protagonists for the different
points of view appeared to be the Department of Justice, upholding
trial by jury, and the TVA, supporting trial by commission. The
chief arguments advanced by the Department were the unusual
expense of commission trials, increased by the dilatory nature of
the proceedings and the long delays before the commissioners. It
was said that, while occasionally an award by a jury might be
rather more substantial than expected, yet at least the matter was
settled with promptness and with finality, even to the point of
giving the property owner this advantage, and was not subject to
expensive delay.
On the other hand, the TVA argued with skill and persuasive
force that it was subject to special problems for which the com-
mission form was admirably adapted. Chief stress was placed upon
the fact that the Authority is a regional agency, faced with the
1909) ; 3 MooRE, loc. cit. supra, note 19; United States v. 86.6 Acres of Land,
44 F. Supp. 495 (D.N.H. 1942).
248 STAT. 70 (1933), 16 U.S.C. § 831x (1946).
"D. C. CODE §§ 16-619 to 16-644; the jury is defined in § 16-629, the trial
and verdict in §§ 16-632, 16-633, the proceedings for setting aside the verdict
and on appeal in §§ 16-633 to 16-638.
1R. 71A (h); see previously suggested alternatives in Preliminary Draft,
June 1947, note 2 supra, R. 71A (h) and Committee's Note.
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necessity of acquiring a very substantial acreage within a relatively
small area. Its permanent program for the people of the Tennessee
Valley, involving so many aspects of regional development, depends
for its success upon their good will and co-operation. The Author-
ity has therefore adopted as a basic principle the one that land
owners must be treated fairly and, so far as possible, must be
treated alike. If this is done the land owners are satisfied; but if a
single land owner recovers in a condemnation case substantially
more than the amount offered, this fact arouses resentment among
the land owners who have accepted the price offered by the Au-
thority. With the commission procedure, with one set of commis-
sioners appointed by the courts to hear all TVA cases, such
uniformity and consistency are probable, certainly more probable
than under separate jury-trial procedure. Thus the Authority has
been unusually successful in its condemnation proceedings. Such
success might be jeopardized by a change.2 4 Indeed the Committee
found upon inquiry from the district judges of the TVA area quite
general satisfaction with the process so far as the commission
form of trial was concerned. 23 Hence the Committee concluded that
this procedure should be retained for this agency.
It should be noted that, while these agencies thus represented
differing points of view, they did not come into direct conflict, each
being willing to allow the other to operate in its chosen field. The
clash came more in the impairment this caused to the principle of
uniformity strongly urged as the fundamental basis of the rule.
This was the position of former President Armstrong of the
American Bar Association, who has been a persistent and, indeed,
a bitter critic of the TVA, objecting most strenuously to the con-
demnation practices and results of this agency.2 6 In this he has
also had support in the columns of the Bar Association Journal.27
He has been forthright in criticism of the Committee as attempting
to work out adjustment of opposing points of view, rather than
directly imposing its own judgment upon the protagonists. So, too,
he has challenged the conclusion which the Committee had drawn
from the answers to its inquiries to judges that this procedure had
met with judicial favor.2 ', But the quotations he gives from various
" Its arguments are set out verbatim in Preliminary Draft, June 1947, note
2 sz'pra, at 15-19. See also United States ex. rel. Tennessee Valley Authority
v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 273 (1943) ; Fain v. United States ex rel. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 145 F. 2d 956, 959 (C.C.A. 6th 1944) ; United States ex. rel.
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Brandon, 153 F. 2d 781 (C.C.A. 6th 1946).
- See Committee's Note, 1948 Report, note 2 supra, at 20, 21; Preliminary
Draft, June 1947, note 2 supra, at 14.
-. See the series of articles cited note 10 supra.
- See citations note 3 supra, e.g., 34 A.B.A.J. 528 (1948).
See in particular his article in 7 F.R.D. 383, 386-389 (1948), also 71
A.B.A. REP. 87, 88 (1946).
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judges go rather to the provision for trial de novo before a panel
of district judges, a provision which the Committee had also found
to be unnecessarily duplicating of effort, as the TVA had itself
indicated. It seems that this additional step might well be elimi-
nated; it is, however, a matter of appellate jurisdiction, within the
control of Congress, rather than of a procedural rule.2' Except in
this one regard, Mr. Armstrong's argument seems to be overborne
by the lessons of actual experience. Indeed, there is perhaps a
certain irony in considering his criticisms of the Committee in the
light of its present direction from the Court to re-examine the
issue lest it has gone too far in depriving other possible regional
developments of the benefit of this experience. Persuasive in this
discussion, too, have been the views of district judges, for example,
forceful and detailed communications to the Committee of District
Judge Paul of Virginia, whose experience has been extensive and
who values the commission method highly.
How to reconcile arguments thus substantial on either side is
difficult. A part of the difficulty obviously is that federal govern-
mental projects involving condemnation may be so diverse. It
seems far from proven that in this regard complete uniformity is
the one required course, whatever the difficulties in its application.
Thus a hasty wartime expansion of a navy yard or an army training
camp may perhaps be better handled by a unique and summary
disposition inappropriate for a potential regional development, as,
for example, of the Missouri Valley. A system allowing for some
measure of diversity of treatment would seem to have much in
its favor.
in this juncture Chairman Mitchell of the Advisory Committee
has suggested for consideration as a possible means of reconcili-
ation of these diverse views a provision which would in general
accept the solution hitherto favored by a majority of the Committee,
that of jury trial, except where Congress has specifically provided
otherwise, subject to the usual rules of waiver thereof, but adding
the proviso "unless the court in its discretion orders that, because
of the character or quantity of the land to be condemned, or for
other reasons in the interest of justice, the issue of compensation
shall be determined by a commission of three persons appointed by
it." The report of such a commission, if ordered, should then have
the high degree of finality accorded to reports of masters under the
general civil rules.30
Some such solution preserving a measure of flexibility in the
Compare Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern R.R., 282 U.S. 10 (1930);
Ayrshire Collieries Corp. v. United States, 331 U.S. 132 (1947).
FED. R. Civ. P. 53 (e) (2). For a previous suggestion of such a solution,
see Committee's Note to Preliminary Draft, June 1947, note 2 supra, at 15.
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procedure would seem necessary if the problem is not to remain
insoluble. Of course Congress could settle the matter very easily
by providing specifically for the form of trial; but all attempts at
solution in this way, particularly by bills for jury trials, have so
far failed.:' Obviously Congress has found the problem just as
difficult of solution as have others. Allowing the indicated discretion
in the district judge will permit adjustment to the particular
exigencies which have been found so necessary, without a great
sacrifice of the principle of uniformity. Seemingly the Department
of Justice will be much nearer its desired solution of speedy and
decisive jury trials than now, when it is subject either to commis-
sion trials alone or to commission trials in the first instance in some
thirty states. While the problem of delay might still remain, yet an
incentive to it could be reduced, as well as expense eliminated, by
a general provision attached to its appropriations, or in other like
form, limiting the amount of compensation to be paid to such com-
missioners.32 At any rate, this is the problem which should be
settled during the year unless adoption of this generally good and
desirable rule is to be inordinately delayed. 3
CERTAIN MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Once the stumbling block of the form of trial of just compensa-
tion is past, all seems comparatively clear sailing. The general
intent of the condemnation rule is, as expressly stated, that, except
as otherwise provided in the rule itself, the general rules of civil
-4 See references to such bills in the Preliminary Draft, June 1947, note 2
supra, at 14, and in the TVA statement, id. at 19. The statute for Mississippi
flood-control, 45 STAT. 536 (1928), 33 U.S.C. § 702d (1946), was amended in
1945, 59 STAT. 587, 33 U.S.C. § 702d (1946), to provide for conformity to state
procedures, any rule of the district court "notwithstanding"; but this did away
with the commission procedure upheld in United States v. Hess, 70 F. 2d 142,
71 F. 2d 78 (C.C.A. 8th 1934). A provision for state conformity (as well as
for use of the state courts) was added to the Natural Gas Act on July 25, 1947,
61 STAT. 459, 15 U.S.C. § 717f (h), following the provisions of the Federal
Power Act, 41 STAT. 1074 (1920), 16 U.S.C. § 814 (1946).
' Such a provision already appears in the TVA Act, 48 STAT. 70 (1933),
16 U.S.C. § 831x (1946), perhaps unduly restrictive in the rates set of a per
diem not to exceed $15 per day, with an a-dditional amount for subsistence of
$5 per day.
' Under the requirements for reporting of the rules, now frozen into law
by 62 STAT. 869, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1948), a rule after adoption by the
Court must be reported to Congress by the Attorney General at the opening of
a regular session and remain dormant there until the close of the session. In
substance, a rule cannot be effective until some fifteen months after its adop-
tion; and any delay in meeting the deadline of the opening of Congress means
necessarily a delay of a year. I have criticized this inflexible procedure else-
where. See CLARK, CODE PLEADING 41-45 (2d ed. 1947) ; Clark, The Influence of
Clark, Experience under the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 8 F.R.D. (March 1949).
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procedure for the United States district courts govern the proceed-
ings.3 4 The more important specialized procedures for condemna-
tion, constituting some variation from the rules for ordinary civil
actions, have been discussed above. Three others of these provisions
are of sufficient interest and importance to deserve special mention.
The first is the provision governing dismissal of the proceeding.
Here it has at times occurred that after proceedings have been
undertaken the United States for one reason or another finds it
necessary or desirable to abandon the proceedings and to relinquish
all attempts to take title. A problem may occur as to how far the
plaintiff may do so over the objection by, and without payment of
damages to, a defendant. This rule attempts to regulate the matter
so far as seems possible, having in mind of course that no judgment
against the United States may be given beyond its consent to be
sued.3 5 It provides in effect that before hearings and acquisitions
of title the plaintiff may dismiss the action as to a particular piece
of property merely by filing a notice thereof, while the parties may
stipulate for dismissal or for vacation of any judgment that has
been entered. Further, at any time before compensation has been
determined and paid, the court may dismiss the action as to par-
ticular property except that "it shall not dismiss the action as to
any part of the property of which the plaintiff has taken possession
or in which the plaintiff has taken title or a lesser interest, but
shall award just compensation for the possession, title or lesser
interest so taken. 3 . 6 A Committee Note states that this is done to
avoid remitting the property owner to another court, "such as the
Court of Claims, to recover just compensation for the property
right taken. Circuity of action is thus prevented without increasing
the liability of the plaintiff to pay just compensation for any
interest that is taken."
37
A second important provision concerns the deposit of money by
" 1948 Report, note 2 supra, R. 71A (a).
Criticism of the rule for not providing for the award of costs, disburse-
ments, and attorneys' fees, Carnahan, 32 A.B.A.J. 883 (1946), citing favorably
CAL. CODE CIV. PRoC. § 1255a (Deering 1941), seems to overlook this restric-
tion against awards against the G~vernment. The matter is one for statutory
remedy, as has been done in the District of Columbia, Act of July 11, 1947,
Pub. L. No. 177, c. 228, amending D. C. CODE § 16-610, U. S. CODE CONG. SERV.
319 (1947). Illustrative cases upholding the Government's right of dismissal are
Matthews v. United States, 113 F. 2d 452 (C.C.A. 8th 1940), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 703 (1940); United States v. Yazoo & Mississippi R.R., 67 F. 2d
1019 (C.C.A. 5th 1934), reversing 4 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. La. 1933); Danforth
v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 281 (1939). The case of United States v. 412.715
Acres of Land, 53 F. Supp. 143 (N.D. Cal. 1943), supports the provision of
the rule prohibiting dismissal where possession is retained.
"1948 Report, note 2 supra, R. 71A (i).
"1948 Report, note 2 supra, at 30.
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the plaintiff with the court for just compensation and its more
speedy distribution to cover the cases of hardship noted above. It
is provided that "the court and attorneys shall expedite the pro-
ceedings for the distribution of the money so deposited and for the
ascertainment and payment of just compensation." Moreover, if
compensation finally awarded any defendant exceeds the amount
which has already been paid to him on distribution of the deposit,
the court shall enter judgment in his favor for the deficiency; while
if the compensation finally awarded is less than the amount already
paid to him, "the court shall enter judgment against him and in
favor of the plaintiff for the overpayment."3'3 Thus the possibility
of some mistake in the amount initially distributed in the light of
the compensation ultimately to be awarded is not a sufficient reason
for delaying a fair and early distribution to which the parties may
be equitably entiled.
The final provision concerns the unusual, but still occasional,
action for condemnation under the law of a state, either instituted
in or removed to a federal court on the basis of diversity of citizen-
ship or alienage.- The provision as to such cases is that the general
practice provided by the rule "may be altered to the extent neces-
sary to observe and enforce any condition affecting the substantial
rights of a litigant attached by the state law to the exercise of the
state's power of eminent domain."' 01 It has been urged that this
leaves the method of trial somewhat in dispute. The alternatives
as to trial set forth in the 1947 draft had made specific and separate
provision for the form of trial under a state's power of eminent
domain.41 These were omitted on the thought that the earlier pro-
vision for trial was adequate. As we have seen, the jury method
of trial was the preferred one in the minds of a majority of the
Committee. It would perhaps still be possible, however, for a dis-
trict judge to rule that a state requirement against jury trial is a
condition affecting the substantial rights of a litigant.
To the mind of the writer, who was doubtful of the Committee's
conclusion, there is another objection to this provision, namely,
that in localities where state action does not allow for jury trial
this may give some incentive to shopping for federal jurisdiction,
where the diversities of diversity jurisdiction may be developed in
order to secure that kind of advantage. It is thought undesirable
' 1948 Report, note 2 sapra, R. 71A (j).
' Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878); Searl v. School-Dist. No. 2,
124 U.S. 197 (1888) ; Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196
U.S. 239 (1909); Franzen v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R.R., 278 Fed. 370, 372
(C.C.A. 7th 1921).
" 1948 Report, note 2 sztpra, R. 71A (k).
'" Preliminary Draft, June 1947, note 2 supra, (h), First and Second Alter-
natives, also (1), First and Second Alternatives.
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to put a premium on bringing such cases into the federal courts
from jurisdictions such as those in the East where it has heretofore
been unknown. All this suggests that the reconsideration now to be
had as to the general provisions for the form of trial may well
extend to the trial of state cases also.
